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Deborah W. Denno*

Death Bed
I am sitting in the witness stand of a courtroom in Frankfort, Kentucky, facing David, a young defense lawyer at Kentucky’s Department
of Advocacy. David is standing at a podium questioning me. It is April
18, 2005. We have been waiting for this moment for a very long time.
I am the first of a dozen expert witnesses to testify in Baze et al. v. Rees
et al.,1 a bench trial concerning the constitutionality of Kentucky’s
lethal injection protocol. Lethal injection is this country’s most widely
used method of executing death row inmates. I am testifying on behalf
of the plaintiffs, Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling, two condemned inmates who are claiming that the Kentucky protocol constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The three defendants involved in this trial are most responsible for
how Kentucky’s executions are handled. They are the Commissioner
of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, the Warden of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, and the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.
For months, David and his colleagues have been preparing for this
trial. I am here because I have studied lethal injection, indeed all of this
country’s execution methods, for nearly fifteen years while a professor at
Fordham University School of Law in New York City. The topic of execution methods has so troubled me that I have continued to follow it
during my entire legal career, in spite of other professional interests and
commitments. To me, the problem with execution methods symbolizes
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nearly everything that has gone astray with the death penalty in this
country.
This courtroom scenario in Frankfort is not what people typically
think of when they hear the word “trial” in the popularized television
sense of that word. Everything about the setting projects smallness and
understatement. Frankfort, the state capital, has a population of less
than 30,000 people. The city’s courthouse is a miniature of all the ones
I have ever seen. There are only two courtrooms in the entire building.
There is no Starbucks. Most certainly, this is no place for a Boston Legal
episode where trials seem like packed fish bowls viewed by hundreds. As
I sit in this courtroom, however, I am continually reminded that some
of the most significant cases ever decided in this country started in locales that many Americans would consider quaint. We merely watch,
not experience, Law & Order lives.
A civil bench trial is also very different from a criminal jury trial. In
a civil bench trial, there is no direct involvement of the inmates’ peers
by way of a jury vote. A prosecutor and defense attorney do not battle
over the guilt or innocence of the inmates. There is little interest in the
original facts of the case. The inmates have already been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. They are not appealing their sentences
and are not even present in the courtroom. Indeed, because this bench
trial is a civil matter and a lawsuit, the inmates, who were previously
called defendants in their criminal case, are now called plaintiffs.
Regardless, the “how” of Kentucky’s executions is the heart of the
plaintiffs’ case. The constitutionality of execution methods is also of
burgeoning significance throughout the country as medical investigations continually reveal the troubling, and all too latent, aspects of
lethal injection. The concern is highly democratic within the death row
inmate population. The risks of an inhumane lethal injection affect
every inmate equally, no matter their color, their class, the quality of
their legal representation or the purported social value of their victim.
Each inmate has been designated by the state to die in the same way. In
this bench trial, we are wrangling over how exactly that death will
occur.
David and I both believe that lethal injection is not what the public and many lawmakers think it is—a serene and soothing way to die,
like putting a sick animal to sleep. We think the process is inhumane
and tortuous, the result of medical folly, political compromise. We want
to convince the Kentucky judge of this. The attorneys representing the
Commonwealth of Kentucky want to convince the judge that we are
142
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wrong. They claim that lethal injection is in fact a humane and suitable
way to die.
This trial will be a battle of experts, but also a battle of words, said
and unsaid. All exchanges will take place within predetermined legal
limits. The challenge is, how can we convey our arguments within the
imposed structure of this hearing and its rules?
The message that will unfold cannot be imparted like a standard
story. Rather, it must reveal itself within the context of three parts: a series of questions that David will ask me and the other experts on direct
examination, what the Commonwealth’s attorney will then ask us under
cross examination, and then what David may want to clarify during
redirect examination. This procedure enables the admission of evidence, rules that have been set out and refined over hundreds of years of
tradition in the British-American legal system. The process is exciting
for me, an academic, accustomed to the hallowed Socratic method, in
which I, as Professor of Law, relentlessly question my students. Now, I
am in the role of answering questions, not asking them. I relish this role.
In the past few years, there have been a number of evidentiary hearings on lethal injection across the country. From lethal injection’s inception in 1977, the method of execution has been continually under
constitutional attack. Yet, lawyers have also always had a great deal of
difficulty finding out the specifics of how a lethal injection is conducted
and what protocols or guidelines have been and are used to ensure that
executions are conducted humanely. The lack of information has made
it impossible to have a thorough challenge to the method’s constitutionality. Over the years, however, a committed group of academics,
lawyers, and doctors have chipped away at the shell of secrecy, releasing
forward a bounty of new information on a wide range of issues. This
2005 trial in Kentucky brings a fresh message: it is the fullest and most
sophisticated investigation of lethal injection ever conducted.

A Note on the Lethal Injection Process
In most states, including Kentucky, lethal injection involves having an
executioner syringe three chemicals into the body of an inmate sentenced to death: sodium thiopenthal, an “ultrashort” acting barbiturate
intended to put the inmate to sleep; pancuronium bromide, a paralytic
agent used to immobilize the inmate; and potassium chloride, a toxin that
induces cardiac arrest and hastens the inmate’s death. These injections
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are to occur sequentially, while the inmate is strapped to a gurney, a
padded stretcher typically used for transporting hospitalized patients.
There have been photos of the execution gurney so artfully shot that the
gurney does indeed look like a bed, an inviting place where a person
would want to stretch out if not for the fact it is to be used for a killing.
I use the term “death bed” to depict this execution scenario even
though these words have not been applied in this context before, either
by legal practitioners or academics. Typically, deathbed connotes the last
few hours of a dying person’s life or the place from which a dying person
makes a final statement. An inmate on an executioner’s gurney, however,
is strapped down, not free, and is dying not because of failed health but
because the state has determined the inmate should be punished to death.
In 2002, I published an article in a symposium issue of the Ohio State
Law Journal focusing on the problems associated with lethal injection.
The article contended that lethal injection was unconstitutional under
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause for a range of reasons: the
procedure involved the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” the
“risk” of such pain, “physical violence,” the offense to “human dignity,”
and the contravention of “evolving standards of decency.”
My conclusions were supported by a large study I conducted of the
most up-to-date protocols for administering lethal injection in all thirtysix states, which, at that time, used anesthesia for state executions. The
study focused on a number of factors that are critical to conducting a
lethal injection humanely, such as: the types and amounts of chemicals
that are injected; the selection, training, preparation, and qualifications
of the lethal injection team; the involvement of medical personnel; the
presence of witnesses, including media witnesses; as well as details on
how the procedure is conducted and how much of it witnesses can see.
The fact that executions are not typically conducted by doctors, but by
execution technicians, is a critical aspect of the process.
In the article, I argued that many of the problems with lethal injection could be attributed to vague lethal injection statutes, uninformed
prison personnel, and skeletal or inaccurate lethal injection protocols.
When some state protocols provide details, such as the amount and type
of chemicals that executioners inject, they often reveal striking errors,
omissions, and ignorance about the procedure. Such inaccurate or missing information heightens the likelihood that a lethal injection will be
botched and suggests that states are not capable of executing an inmate
without violating the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
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Over the decades, there have been many drawbacks associated with
lethal injection, all of which contradict the public’s perception that injection is a peaceful way to die. First, evidence suggests that some inmates are given insufficient amounts of the initial chemical, sodium
thiopental, and therefore regain consciousness while being injected
with the second and third chemicals. In this situation, the inmate will
suffer extraordinary pain while the second chemical, pancuronium bromide, takes its paralytic effect, preventing the inmate from moving or
communicating in any way. Then when the third chemical, potassium
chloride, is administered to cause death, the paralyzed inmate will experience a burning sensation likened to a hot poker inserted into his
arm, which spreads over his entire body until it causes the heart to stop.
It is striking that the American Veterinary Medical Association has
condemned the use of pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride for
the euthanasia of animals because the paralyzing effect of the pancuronium bromide would mask the excruciating pain that the animal was experiencing from the potassium chloride. These chemicals are too
horrifying for killing animals but they are routinely used to execute
human beings.
The vagueness of the protocols also results in executioners often ignoring an inmate’s particular physical characteristics (such as age, body
weight, drug use), factors that have a major impact on an individual’s reactions to chemicals and the condition of their veins. Physicians have
problems finding suitable veins for injection among individuals who are
diabetic, obese, or extremely muscular. Heavy drug users, who constitute
a significant portion of the death row population, present particularly
difficult challenges because of their damaged veins and resistance to
even high levels of lethal injection chemicals.
All of these difficulties are compounded for untrained executioners,
who are the ones typically carrying out the protocols. For example, executioners having trouble finding a vein because of obesity or drug use
may insert a catheter into a sensitive area of the body, such as a groin or
hand. In some cases, if a vein can still not be found, executioners will
perform a “cut-down” procedure, which requires an incision to expose
the damaged vein. The cut-down procedure is used with disturbing frequency in lethal injection executions, while it is only a memory to modern day anesthesiologists, who have far more feasible alternatives. The
cut-down problem has even caught the eye of the Supreme Court. In
May 2004, in Nelson v. Campbell,2 the Court unanimously held that an
Alabama death row inmate could file a civil rights suit to challenge the
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state’s proposal to execute him with a cut-down procedure. Nelson is the
first case where the Court has addressed the lethal injection issue. While
the Nelson case did not concern the merits of lethal injection, it appears
the Court may have already come to terms with the broader aspects
of the procedure because the Court was willing to call into question one
aspect of it.

The Kentucky Trial’s Rules and Constraints
This backdrop puts perspective on the bench trial in Frankfort and the
issues concerning the lethal injection protocol in Kentucky. Three days
before the trial, I flew to Lexington, Kentucky, to stay at the home of my
friend and colleague, Roberta Harding, a professor at the University of
Kentucky School of Law. Roberta and I had met some years ago while
working together on a death penalty issue and she was closely involved
with some of the cases handled by the Kentucky Department of Advocacy. My early arrival in Lexington gave me the opportunity to prepare,
to confer with Roberta who would also be attending the trial, as well as
to have a few moments to take in the Kentucky countryside.
The rolling hills of bluegrass were never more glorious than during
our Monday morning drive to Frankfort, timed so that Roberta and I
could reach the courthouse sufficiently early to touch base with the attorneys beforehand. Although the drive was only forty-five minutes, it
was an amazingly refreshing trip given the abundance of greenery and
the burst of a spring season that had not quite yet arrived in New York.
The city of Frankfort was surrounded by all things rural, and I could not
help but envy its residents.
The state capital since 1792, Frankfort has a charming, small town
feel. Its buildings and homes are gorgeously historic, a snapshot of the
early architectural wonder of our country. The Frankfort courthouse is
an aptly elegant structure for holding such an important trial. But my
feelings of awe in this setting were quickly marred by the reality of the
circumstances of our visit—as though the city’s gentility was on a collision course with the ugliness of our purpose for being there. To me, the
death penalty and lethal injection in particular were reminders of all the
damage that people can do to one another no matter what the blessings
of their surroundings. It was as though we as a society felt that we did
not quite deserve such harmony, such beauty, and therefore had to go
and foil it in some was by scavenging for our more brutal natures. Were
146
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we truly meant to be such two-sided beings or did we simply fail to appreciate what we had been given? No matter. Brutality seemed to be
abounding that day. I had no time to pick apart my thoughts. We had
work to do. Up the courthouse steps we went.
Of course, the outcome of a bench trial is heavily dependent on the
judge. I had heard good things about Judge Roger L. Crittenden, the
Circuit Court judge whose courtroom demeanor and decisions would be
so important to our case. Judge Crittenden, a registered Democrat and
graduate of the University of Kentucky School of Law, was a Franklin
District Court judge from 1980-1991, before becoming a Franklin Circuit Court judge in 1992. With over 25 years total on the bench, he
seemed to have a solid foundation for evaluating the evidence. But this
was a case with political overtones. At the time of the trial, Judge Crittenden was one of three candidates Kentucky’s governor was considering to fill a vacancy on the heavily Republican Kentucky Supreme
Court. Ultimately, Kentucky’s governor selected a Republican nominee
for the vacancy, an outcome that the press viewed as predictably political. At the time of this writing, Judge Crittenden had expressed “disappointment” with not being asked to take the post but had not yet
indicated that he would seek election to the Kentucky Supreme Court
in 2006.
It was difficult to tell if these circumstances would have any impact
on the outcome of the bench trial. In news reports, Judge Crittenden
has characterized his decisions as more conservative than liberal. A
number of commentators had noted, however, that Judge Crittenden
does not show a clear discernible pattern in his voting record. Judge
Crittenden himself had stated that he approached all issues on a caseby-case basis. This reputation made the outcome in our case seem even
less predictable.
I learned before my travels to Frankfort about the constraints on the
substance of my testimony. These rules inhibit an expert’s language, the
specific words they can use, and the ways their statements can be
phrased. And, such restrictions make the process of testifying somewhat
more difficult.
David detailed the constraints the Commonwealth’s attorneys
specifically requested for my testimony. First, I cannot talk about the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or how it
is to be interpreted or has been interpreted. This is understandable. The
judge decides the law, not the expert.
Second, I am forbidden to give a medical opinion about the chem147
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icals used in a lethal injection execution. Again, this limitation makes
sense. I am not a medical doctor and have no experience working with
these chemicals, even though I have read a great deal about them. Any
discussion of cut-down procedures is also barred, presumably for the
same reason.
Next, I am prohibited from mentioning Fred Leuchter. I find this request most perplexing. Until 1990, Leuchter was the creator of most of
this country’s execution machinery. I had written earlier about
Leuchter’s grip on the execution methods industry and long ago, I had
even had a lengthy discussion with him. But Leuchter’s story involved
far more than just execution methods. He was an unrelenting public
speaker who denied the existence of the Holocaust and was obsessed
with the revisionist movement.
Leuchter’s controversial side garnered him a spotlight. Jewish groups
took notice, discovering that Leuchter was not the “engineer” he
claimed he was but rather only the holder of a bachelor’s degree in history—in other words, no more educationally qualified to build execution equipment than the typical arts and sciences graduate, no matter
how self-taught in the area he professed to be. Leuchter told me the revelation destroyed his business. No warden would go near him publicly
although privately wardens still called him for advice because there was
simply no one else available with Leuchter’s execution methods expertise. Further, no person or corporation was rushing to fill the gaping hole
in such a socially repellant enterprise.
There is so much more I could say about Leuchter and his false
representations that my account of him here is a sugarcoating. I suppose that the Commonwealth’s attorneys thought that Leuchter’s
well-documented revisionist antics would be highly prejudicial, that his
purported pro-Nazi leanings would distract from the merits of the lethal
injection arguments. Of course, I have always thought that Leuchter exemplified in his own bizarre way the true underbelly of the execution
methods business. Directly or indirectly, he is responsible for how the
great majority of inmates in this country have been executed and how
they will be executed. The fragile state of the execution methods industry is highlighted by the fact that wardens continued to depend on
Leuchter despite all that has been exposed about him.
Lastly, I could not discuss the topic of electrocution. Again, this
seems to make sense to me although I can see how the topic could creep
into this trial on grounds of relevancy. On March 31, 1998, the Kentucky legislature voted to switch the state’s method of execution from
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electrocution to lethal injection. However, like a number of other state
legislatures that voted to change from electrocution to lethal injection,
the legislature did not entirely eliminate electrocution as a method of
execution for some inmates. If the condemned inmate was sentenced to
death before the March 31, 1998 date, he can still be executed by electrocution if he makes it an affirmative choice. Under the principles of ex
post facto, a state legislature may decide to leave an option available so
that an inmate may not be worse off by any legislature’s enacted change
after the date of his crime. There are still nearly thirty Kentucky inmates
remaining who can choose between electrocution or lethal injection.
Still, it is one of the many contradictions in this area that Kentucky
or any state allows such a choice between execution methods for some
inmates but not for others, based upon the date when the newer and
presumably more humane method was legislated and the date of the
commission of the inmate’s crime. This compromise tactic is not atypical, however. And, for some states, the situation can get even more
complicated. For example, South Carolina has a unique choice provision with no apparent purpose apart from some odd compromise based
upon statutes in other states. As of June 8, 1995, all inmates in South
Carolina can choose between electrocution and lethal injection as a
method of execution no matter when they were sentenced to death.
The differences come for those inmates who fail to choose either
method, and therefore are assigned by default the method prescribed by
statute. Those inmates sentenced to death before June 8, 1995, are executed by electrocution if they do not choose lethal injection; those inmates sentenced to death after June 8, 1995, are executed by lethal
injection if they do not choose electrocution. While this statutory
scheme is one of the more weirdly convoluted, in a very basic way, all
the schemes are.
One reason for such a peculiar approach to selecting execution
methods is a concern that all state legislatures have when it comes to
the death penalty: If the legislatures introduce a new method of execution, such as lethal injection, the old method, typically electrocution,
will be presumed unconstitutional. Some state statutes go so far as to
make certain that the old method of execution (such as electrocution)
is not rendered unconstitutional simply because lethal injection has
been introduced. With this kind of statutory jig, state legislatures attempt to ensure that no method of execution will ever become unconstitutional, thereby barring any suggestion that the death penalty in
general is vulnerable to constitutional attack. Like all death penalty ju149
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risprudence, the topic of execution methods is rife with irony, doublethink, irrationality, and obfuscation. Thus, it is endlessly fascinating.

The Kentucky Trial Begins
With these and other constraints in place, the trial begins. Because I am
the first witness, I must wait outside in the hallway during the initial
proceedings, until the judge calls my name and a bailiff comes to get me.
I am sitting in a chair near the water fountain, yearning to testify. I
feel as though two inmates’ lives are hanging in the balance along with
potentially every other death row inmate in the country. I believe that
much of this trial is about how death penalty politics get in the way of
justice and, in this particular case, even common sense.
But I am not the only one waiting in the hallway. There are several
other witnesses lined up to be called. Out of curiosity, I try to overhear
their conversations as a group of them stand in the corner to the right
of me. I think that they are prison administrators, most likely there to
be questioned about the lethal injection procedures during their earlier
tenure at the Kentucky State Penitentiary.
In the corner to my left, a reporter is questioning a pastor about the
death penalty. The pastor clearly thinks lethal injection is unconstitutional and is telling the reporter his views with great passion. I turn once
again to my right and look at one of the prison administrators who is
speaking the loudest in the group. I believe he says to his colleagues that
he did not want to come to the trial this morning. In a way, I can understand his line of thinking. He was delegated a role he should never
have been given. The legislatures make such important decisions initially about the death penalty, only to pass on the actual implementation of their choices, such as what execution method to use, to prison
personnel who have no training or expertise to carry them out. This
process does not seem fair to those on the lowest level of the political
hierarchy, much less to the inmates who bear the brunt of such an irresponsible degree of delegation.
The door to the courtroom opens and I look up expecting to see a
bailiff. Instead, I see one of the defense attorneys who is coming out in
the hallway to drink from the water fountain. He looks at me and
chuckles, “Now I get to see a law professor on the stand.” It is a funny
comment for this setting, and I grin in response to it. Of course, the attorney is referring to the fact that the tables are turned. I represent
150
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“every law professor” who has ever administered the Socratic method to
a student in class—an experience all law students abhor, no matter their
veil of seeming arrogance when questioned, no matter how kind the law
professor attempts to be.
Modern-day law professors no longer try to emulate the famously
sadistic Professor Kingsley in One-L, Scott Turow’s poignant account of
first year law school. We make an effort to be gentle, realizing that no
good, and certainly no pedagogic value, derives from embarrassment.
The rewards of such professorial concern, however, have an airtight cap.
It is the experience itself that students fear—that perilous verbal test before dozens of their peers—that marks their intellectual reputation in
class and provides life-long fodder for the inevitable law school yarns.
Everyone who has been a law student knows those Socratic professor
nightmares; they never go away.
Oddly, these thoughts spur my desire to get into the courtroom with
the hope of setting the record straight. I have the Socratic method
down. Being grilled does not concern me. The door opens once again
and the bailiff calls me in.
I walk into the courtroom for the second time that morning. I had
wanted to see the room before I testified, so that I would have my bearings, no atmospheric surprises. The courtroom is sunny and relatively
modern, obviously refurbished from its original appearance. At my first
viewing, I was crushed to see that it looked so new and cheap, from the
synthetic paneling of the jury box to the institutional beige walls and
rugs to the moveable video cameras off to the side. I had wanted to see
the original structure, thinking how magnificent it must have been at
one point. I had envisioned, say, mahogany walls, an antique gold clock,
intricate weaves. Now the scene appears Wal-Mart-like, a jarring contrast to the historic loveliness of the city around it.
I cannot help but think that this redone setting will have an effect
on the outcome of the case, as though it is not just the architecture that
was covered in bland courtroom “modernese” but our ideals and values
as well. There is something very unnerving about the sterile, medicalized, guise of lethal injection that makes it seem as though it is progressive, when in fact it is anything but that. Rather, it is medical technology
gone awry, used for a goal that was never intended. From this perspective, then, perhaps the decor of this courtroom is actually much more
appropriate for the subject matter of this bench trial than the grand design of yonder years. After all, it does seem as though our criminal justice system has become covered in thick ugly plastic.
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I am surprised at how many people are sitting in the courtroom
gallery and by the sizeable number of reporters who have appeared. It is
clear that a contingent of individuals is very interested in this issue, and
I sense that they share my side. After all, lethal injection advocates need
not make the effort to attend such a trial. They are still winning this war.
The bailiff is kind and makes sure that I am seated before he leaves
my side. As I turn to take the oath, Judge Crittenden greets me with a
nod and smile before swearing me in. I appreciate the gestures. I am not
accustomed to such cordiality in this context. I have testified as an expert before and, when judges have already made up their minds, they
can make it clear that your presence is not wanted.

Questions and Answers
I glance up and there is David, looking very serious. It is only the second time I have ever seen him. As with all hearings, David’s questions
start with addressing my qualifications. What is your current profession?
How long have you been a professor of law? Where have your previously testified in court concerning lethal injection?
My answers are short and clipped, basically one-liners. They have to
be. In 1997, I had testified in two evidentiary hearings on lethal injection. One hearing was in Texas (the first such hearing in the country),
the other in Connecticut, which, in 1997, had not yet executed anyone
by lethal injection. During the Kentucky trial, I knew that it was considered relevant only to say the names of the states and the years. But I
wanted to have been able to say more.
I would have liked to have noted that the Texas and Connecticut
hearings occurred eight years ago and that a great deal more information
and more scientific data on lethal injection had emerged since that
time. Only those individuals studying the process for many years would
realize this evolution. The opinions from the 1997 hearings were not
openly published, so no outsider would ever know about them or the
dearth of knowledge then before the courts. Looking back on the first
hearing in Texas, I realize in retrospect how little we knew about lethal
injection. Modern evidence has only confirmed our earlier statements
about the worrisome application of the chemicals, and has revealed
even more problems.
The next set of questions David asks me concern what I have written on the topic and for how long. As a law professor, have you researched
152
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lethal injection? When did you begin to research lethal injection? How many
texts or articles on lethal injection have you published?
I give the titles of five publications. David asks me to go through
each of them and discuss what they are about. Unfortunately for the
purposes of my testimony, each article has a substantial analysis of the
Eighth Amendment and how the doctrine may apply to execution
methods. The Eighth Amendment was one of the areas I was prohibited
from mentioning in my testimony. When I briefly gloss over the substance of this discussion, the Commonwealth’s attorney immediately
objects, reminding me that I cannot reference the Eighth Amendment.
I find out by virtue of his objection that I cannot even mention that I discussed the Eighth Amendment in an article. It is as though the topic is
profane.
My statements are strictly confined to repeating some of the more
technical aspects of my articles, most particularly my 2002 Ohio State
Law Journal publication on the survey of lethal injection protocols. Although my 2002 article has been introduced into the record, one purpose of my testimony is to demonstrate how Kentucky in particular fares
relative to other states as well as to emphasize aspects of the article that
are particularly relevant to this bench trial.
The Eighth Amendment cap in the trial reminds me of how rarely
the substance of the amendment is addressed, even in the professional,
legal literature. The Eighth Amendment is widely applied in practice,
but peculiarly skirted in academia. For example, the principles of the
Eighth Amendment are typically not examined in detail in mainstream
constitutional law or criminal procedure books. The doctrine also falls
through the cracks in law school classes unless a professor specifically focuses on the death penalty, which is usually covered in a seminar. A
comparable kind of neglect is shown when state and federal cases apply
the amendment, as they commonly do in a range of circumstances. In
the execution methods context in particular, citations to legal doctrines
arising from the Eighth Amendment—or the phrase “Cruel and Unusual Punishment”—are commonly truncated and often inaccurate and
incomplete.
David now focuses on my 2002 publication, which examined the results of my survey of lethal injection protocols. How did you go about researching and reviewing execution protocols, procedures, and the chemicals
used in lethal injections?
I explain that at the time the survey was conducted, thirty-six states
had statutes authorizing anesthesia for a state execution. My research
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assistant first checked to see if the protocols for these thirty-six states
were publicly available, that is in public venues beyond what was designated in a state statute, such as information set out in Web sites, described in court cases, or provided in some other kind of hard copy
documentation. For those protocols that were not publicly available, my
assistant would usually call the state’s department of corrections or another state agency to gather necessary information, particularly details
on the types of chemicals used and the qualifications and training of executioners. State officials would provide us with all or some part of this
information we were seeking, either over the phone or by e-mail.
I point out that for seven states, the information on lethal injection
chemicals was declared unavailable. Officials in four states said that the
information was confidential (Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
and Virginia); three additional states said the information did not exist
(Kansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire). I hone in on the following
point that particularly distinguished Kentucky’s “nonexistent” information. When my assistant called Kentucky’s Department of Corrections,
he was told that while there was a statute that describes the use of the
death penalty, Kentucky did not have a protocol or policy to implement
executions by lethal injection. My assistant was informed that the protocol would be applied on a case-by-case basis. This fact has great relevance to the reasons for this trial.
Of course, David is trying to show that even though Kentucky now
has a somewhat publicly available protocol, none existed in the fall of
2001, when I conducted my survey. Indeed, the Department of Corrections’ representative told my assistant over the phone that “[t]he protocol would be dictated by each case as it comes up.” This procedure
screamed out an absence of care and planning on the part of the Department of Corrections. There was no documented format for an attorney to investigate or challenge.
David’s next series of questions tie this information about Kentucky
to the broader history and procedure of lethal injection, focusing specifically on the kinds of chemicals Kentucky now says it will use in the future. How many states currently have the death penalty?
I say, 37 states, noting that New York recently abolished the death
penalty.
How many states currently use lethal injection as a method of
execution?
I say, 36 states, excluding New York. What I do not say is that
Nebraska is the only state left that does not use lethal injection. The
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Nebraska legislature has, however, considered a number of bills proposing that the state switch to lethal injection from electrocution, now the
state’s only legalized method of execution.
With the next series of questions, David planned to delve into the
history of lethal injection and how it began to be used in this country.
Which state was the first to adopt lethal injection? I say, Oklahoma. In what
year? 1977. How did Oklahoma go about adopting lethal injection as a
method of execution?
My answer to this question is deceptively short out of necessity and
deference to the boundaries that are imposed upon me by the proceedings. In the trial I tell how in 1977, the now-deceased Senator Bill Dawson of Oklahoma asked Dr. Stanley Deutsch, then head of the
Department of Anesthesiology at the University of Oklahoma Health
Sciences Center, to recommend a manner of executing inmates by way
of an injection of lethal chemicals. Senator Dawson was concerned
about the high cost of fixing the electric chair that Oklahoma already
had or building a new gas chamber, which could cost thousands of dollars. Besides, Dr. Deutsch had informed him that lethal injection was a
viable means of execution. In a short, typo-ridden, letter to Senator
Dawson dated February 28, 1977, Dr. Deutsch made some recommendations for how a lethal injection might take place. His recommendations included the use of two different kinds of chemicals for an
injection.
That is where the story ends for purposes of the trial but there was
far more to tell about how Oklahoma’s lethal injection statute was written. What I had to leave out of my testimony was that in May, 1977,
three months after Dr. Deutsch had sent his letter to Senator Dawson,
Oklahoma adopted a lethal injection statute based in large part on Dr.
Deutsch’s letter suggesting employment of two types of chemicals. Indeed, Oklahoma’s lethal injection statute, which has been copied by
many other states, repeats nearly verbatim the terms that Dr. Deutsch
wrote in his letter to Senator Dawson.
Dr. Deutsch’s letter stated that unconsciousness and then “death”
would be produced by “[t]he administration . . . intravenously . . . in
[specified] quantities of . . . an ultra-short-acting barbiturate (for example, sodium thiopental) in “combination” with a “nueormuscular [sic]
blocking drug[ ]” (for example, pancuronium bromide) to create a “long
duration of paralysis.” Oklahoma’s lethal injection statute, which tracks
the language of Dr. Deutsch’s letter almost word for word, states that
“[t]he punishment of death must be inflicted by continuous, intravenous
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administration of a lethal quantity of an ultra-short-acting barbiturate in
combination with a chemical paralytic agent until death is pronounced by
a licensed physician according to accepted standards of medical practice.” It is a disturbing thought indeed that a statute of such extraordinary significance for people’s lives, and deaths, is based on such a short
and informal correspondence.
David’s next few questions probe more specifically into how Oklahoma came up with the particular types of chemicals that the state’s Department of Corrections selected for its protocol. Since the publication
of my 2002 statewide study of lethal injection protocols, lawyers have
been able to acquire, through the Freedom of Information Act, Oklahoma’s initial 1978 protocol, as it was originally written.
What chemicals did Oklahoma use in its first lethal injection protocol? I
say, sodium thiopental and a paralytic agent. There was more information I could not divulge because it was not relevant for the purposes of
answering this particular question. Oklahoma’s 1978 protocol specifically mentions sodium thiopental as the ultra-short-acting barbiturate,
but includes a possible choice of three paralytic agents: “either tubocurarine or succinylcholine chloride or potassium chloride.” Dr. Deutsch’s letter mentions “succinylcholine” but not tubo-curarine or potassium
chloride.
This revelation about the choices of three paralytic agents in Oklahoma’s 1978 protocol is astonishing. It has always been a mystery how
potassium chloride ever became the third chemical to be employed in a
lethal injection procedure. Potassium chloride’s inclusion as a paralytic
agent in Oklahoma’s protocol, and the fact that this formula was then unthinkingly copied in other states, is one possible explanation.
In order to emphasize the fact that it was problematic for the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to select these chemicals, David uses
the next set of questions to establish that at no time was any research
conducted on the effects of any of these drugs on the human body in the
context of an execution. The lack of any kind of study has always been
one of the more shocking discoveries about the lethal injection procedure. Of course, it is impossible to test directly a mechanism for killing
people. Further, the kind of experimentation that was carried out in the
1800s on animals to determine the effectiveness of electrocution on humans would most likely be prohibited today. At the same time, it is clear
that more thorough research could have been attempted on the potential impact of these lethal injection chemicals on the human body given
what we know about their use for other purposes.
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Did your research reveal the reason why these particular chemicals
[sodium thiopental and pancuronium bromide] were to be used [by Oklahoma]? My answer: Other than Dr. Deutsch’s letter and its recommendations, my research revealed no other basis for Oklahoma to have
chosen these particular chemicals.
What if any medical or scientific studies on the effects of these chemicals
when used for a lethal injection were conducted before Oklahoma adopted the
chemicals for lethal injection? My answer: No such studies were ever conducted.
What if any medical or scientific studies on whether these chemicals
caused pain when used for a lethal injection were conducted before Oklahoma
adopted the chemicals for lethal injection? My answer: My research revealed
no such studies were conducted.
What if any medical or scientific studies were conducted before Oklahoma
adopted lethal injection to determine whether other chemicals could be used?
My answer: No such studies were conducted.
Oklahoma became the first state to adopt lethal injection as a method of
execution in 1977. How many states since have adopted lethal injection as a
method of execution? My answer: 36 states.
Out of the 36 states, from how many have you reviewed execution protocols or other information concerning their lethal injection procedures? My
answer: 28 states.
Why did you not review the protocols of all 36 states? My answer: At
the time of my study in 2001, Alabama had not yet adopted lethal injection. And seven states, as I mentioned, either informed me that the
information about protocols was confidential or that it did not exist. In
sum, 28 states (with lethal injection) + 1 state (Alabama, which did not
have lethal injection) + 7 states (with missing information) = 36 states.
How many of these states use the two chemicals originally adopted in Oklahoma? My answer: 27 states. Also, there may be others since seven
states did not disclose their procedures or protocols.
Which states follow Oklahoma? My answer: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
Based on your research, what if any medical or scientific studies on the
effects of these chemicals were conducted before these states adopted the
chemicals for lethal injection? My answer: There were no studies conducted.
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What about whether the chemicals cause pain? My answer: There were
no studies conducted.
What about other chemicals that could be used? My answer: There were
no studies conducted.
At this point, David starts focusing on the third chemical, potassium chloride, as well as on the two states that deviate from the typical
three-chemical lethal injection pattern. The purpose of this line of
questioning is to highlight the peculiar origins of the use of potassium
chloride and how it too has questionable applicability to an execution
by lethal injection.
Which, if any, states do not use sodium thiopental and pancuronium bromide? My answer: New Jersey.
What does New Jersey use? My answer: The applicable statute indicates that sodium thiopental and potassium chloride are to be administered. What I do not say because it is not deemed relevant to this line
of questioning is that the New Jersey Department of Corrections has
noted consistently over the years that when it does execute an inmate,
it plans to use three drugs, including one to stop breathing. This tactic
suggests that state statutes may not reflect the actuality of an execution
when decision-making power is delegated to prison personnel. In the
case of New Jersey, contrary to statute, prison officials have said that
they actually plan to inject pancuronium bromide or a paralytic agent
that is similar to it.
How did potassium chloride come to be used in lethal injections? My answer: There are three plausible sources. First, Oklahoma’s original 1978
protocol mentioned potassium chloride under its list of potential paralytic agents to be employed in an execution. Second, advising doctors,
some of whom were involved in developing state execution protocols,
such as New Jersey’s, added potassium chloride although it is not clear
when or why. Third, Fred Leuchter may have suggested including potassium chloride.
My answer about Leuchter is short because it had been stipulated
that I not mention him. Yet, his role was clearly relevant to answering the question that David asked me. What I did not say was that,
according to Leutcher, the New Jersey doctors agreed with his recommendation that potassium chloride be included as the third chemical in the lethal injection machine that Leuchter had created for
New Jersey’s executions in the early 1980s. Because the medical literature did not specify what dosages of the chemicals were adequate to
be lethal, Leuchter said that he relied on information that was avail158
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able for the slaughtering of pigs and estimated the dosages accordingly.
Which states use sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride in lethal injections? My answer: The 27 states mentioned
previously, apart from North Carolina, which injects only sodium
thiopental and potassium chloride.
Which, if any, of these states conducted any scientific or medical studies
on the effects of these three chemicals when used in combination for lethal injection? As I started to answer this question, the Commonwealth’s attorney objected, explaining that this same kind of question had already
been asked. The judge agreed and David moved on.
The next line of David’s questioning concerned North Carolina,
which was apparently one of the states officials at the Kentucky Department of Corrections investigated to develop the protocol that Kentucky
had at the time of the bench trial in Frankfort. During the four-year period between when I examined Kentucky’s protocol in my 2001 survey
and the time of the 2005 bench trial, Kentucky officials had developed
a protocol. The reason why David mentioned North Carolina in his
questions was because North Carolina was one of the nine states in my
2001 survey that disclosed the exact dosages for chemicals executioners
injected into the inmate. The dosage of sodium thiopental was of particular interest because of evidence that executioners did not inject sufficient amounts of it in order to successfully anesthetize inmates.
Therefore, an inmate would still be conscious while he was paralyzed by
the pancuronium bromide and thus be unable to express pain. In the
Kentucky protocol, officials listed that inmates be administered three
grams of sodium thiopental, two grams less than the amount North Carolina said it administered in my survey. David was attempting to document this strange discrepancy in amounts between North Carolina and
Kentucky.
Did you review North Carolina’s execution protocol in preparing your
2002 article? Yes.
What anesthetic do they use? Sodium thiopental.
At the time of your article, what quantity of anesthetic did North Carolina administer? Five grams.
In preparation for your testimony today, have you reviewed Kentucky’s
lethal injection protocol? Yes.
According to the protocol, what chemicals are administered in a lethal injection execution in Kentucky? Sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide,
and potassium chloride.
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Are the first two chemicals used in Kentucky’s lethal injections the same
chemicals that were originally adopted in Oklahoma? My answer: Yes.
This ended the direct examination. Of course, it is only a very small
part of the whole lethal injection story. A cross examination of my testimony also followed but, it is too lengthy and uninformative to recount
here. As it turns out, with respect to my testimony, Judge Crittenden’s
final opinion primarily relied on the evidence revealed during my direct
examination. Because of the inadequacy of the cross examination, this
outcome did not surprise me.

The Aftermath
As soon as I finish testifying, I leave the courtroom and speak briefly
with some reporters in the hallway who are writing stories about the
bench trial. I then head back into the courtroom, this time to listen to
the testimony of two of the prison administrators who were waiting
in the hallway with me beforehand. The administrators’ ignorance of
the lethal injection procedure and their lack of documentation of how
the technique was developed seem very clear to me as they speak. At the
same time, both witnesses are articulate and straightforward about how
they conducted their duties. I am impressed by them. Again, I cannot
help but feel that they and their counterparts in other states are the victims of legislatures’ statewide romance with lethal injection—the details
of which are left to the imagination of ill-informed prison personnel.
I would like nothing more than to hear the next four days of testimony by the remaining expert witnesses. However, I must catch a plane
back to New York that afternoon. I am sorry to leave the tranquility of
Frankfort. And I hope to return to the city, but only as a delighted
tourist.
The next day I read news coverage of the Frankfort trial. I can already tell that the topic of the trial affects people very emotionally. In
the course of a few hours, three strangers have e-mailed me their opinions about my testimony (see the Appendix). They are critical of what
I said and what they think I am trying to achieve. Facets of all three emails represent standard views in this country toward the death penalty
and lethal injection specifically.
What is most striking, however, is the extent to which the e-mails
go beyond the issues at hand. For example, I would expect the commentators to emphasize typical pro-death penalty themes: the percep160

TriQuarterly Journal #124

5/9/06

4:34 PM

Page 161

tion that the victims and their families are neglected, that inmates are
coddled and will be set free, and that people testifying against lethal injection are simply against the death penalty in general. But e-mailer #1
uses comparisons to Hitler to emphasize how he feels about my views,
claiming that “[t]he skilled American Judiciary creates more individual
horror than Adolph Hitler could possibly imagine. . . . [W]ith the predominance of maggot mentality on both sides of the bench that exist in
contemporary judicial circles, I fear the worst!” In turn, e-mailer #2 presumes that “people like [Professor Denno] would claim they [the inmates] have been rehabilitated, and should be returned to society.” Of
course, this subject had nothing to do with the bench trial and has never
been a topic I have addressed publicly. E-mailer #3 analyzes my views on
the death penalty in the context of his strong political leanings and
even his opinions toward gay marriage: “When my president George
Bush keeps appointing more conservative justices to the courts during
the remaining [sic] of his administration the liberal groups will find great
difficulty if not impossible [sic] to change certain laws concerning the
death penalty and gay marriage.” Likewise, “[a]s our population [sic] the
baby boomers ages they become more conservative and a huge voting
block to be reckon [sic] with. Remember it’s the ‘Red States’ that
count!”
I am not surprised by these kinds of sentiments. As a death penalty
researcher, I have received heatedly negative correspondence before. I
have no fruitful way to respond to those who write, except to thank
them for expressing their views, because I believe the mailers’ perspectives deal with a conglomerate of matters often having no direct relevance to the death penalty. What concerns me most, however, is how
similar types of more publicly voiced opinions may affect the outcome
of death penalty cases—perhaps even the bench trial that I just attended in Frankfort.

The Final Opinion
On July 8, 2005, Judge Crittenden released his decision. With one exception, he upheld the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection
procedure. I was very disappointed with this outcome, of course. But I
also thought the press accounts of this bottom line conclusion belied the
details and true significance of all that Judge Crittenden actually wrote.
For those of us in the death penalty trenches, a close read of the opin161
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ion reveals some extraordinary and unprecedented statements about the
flaws of the lethal injection procedure, as well as recommendations for
how it should be improved.
It is remarkable, for example, that Judge Crittenden states that one
part of Kentucky’s protocol was indeed unconstitutional. He held that it
was cruel and unusual for the Kentucky protocol to allow Department of
Corrections personnel to insert a catheter into the condemned’s neck.
No judge has ever made such a finding about lethal injection. Judge
Crittenden appeared to be particularly influenced by the testimony of a
medical doctor with the Kentucky Department of Corrections. That
doctor stated that he would refuse to perform the neck injection procedure and that those who would be performing it are insufficiently
trained to do so. Judge Crittenden’s perspective on this matter is very
clear: “The Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the procedure where the Department of Corrections attempts to insert an intravenous catheter into the neck through the
carotid artery or jugular vein does create a substantial risk of wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain, torture or lingering death.” (pp. 12–13)
Judge Crittenden also made novel findings of fact in response to a
number of important points raised during the bench hearing that I think
will be critical in future litigation on lethal injection, or it should be.
First, Judge Crittenden fully accepted arguments that two of the chemicals (sodium thiopental and pancuronium bromide) used in lethal injection executions derived directly from Dr. Deutsch’s recommendations
to then-Senator Bill Dawson in 1977. Further, the opinion emphasized
that there was “scant evidence” that any of the states that have since
adopted lethal injection, including Kentucky, engaged in any research
on lethal injection to justify their decision to follow Oklahoma’s lead.
“Rather, it is this Court’s impression that the various States simply fell
in line relying solely on Oklahoma’s protocol from Dr. Deutsch in drafting and approving a lethal injection protocol. Kentucky is no different.”
(p. 2)
Likewise, Judge Crittenden accentuates the lack of research and
study in other aspects involved in the creation of lethal injection protocols. He notes, for instance, that “[t]hose persons assigned the initial
task of drafting the [Commonwealth of Kentucky’s] first lethal injection
protocol were provided with little to no guidance on drafting a lethal injection protocol and were resolved to mirror protocols in other states,
namely Indiana, Virginia, Georgia, and Alabama.” (p. 6) For example,
Department of Corrections personnel “did not conduct any indepen162
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dent or scientific or medical studies or consult any medical professionals
concerning the drugs and dosage amounts to be injected into the condemned.” (p. 6) Such reluctance to seek expertise continues to the present day, a revelation that was made especially noteworthy when the
Kentucky Department of Corrections decided to up its dosage level of
sodium pentathol. As Judge Crittenden explains, “[n]or were any medical personnel consulted in 2004 when the lethal injection protocol
dosage of sodium thiopental . . . was increased from 2 grams to 3 grams.”
(pp. 6–7)
Judge Crittenden’s decision also makes clear that the Kentucky Department of Corrections instituted three major improvements in its
lethal injection process in preparation for the Frankfort bench trial.
These kinds of changes demonstrate that the Department of Corrections was well aware that aspects of its protocol were vulnerable to constitutional attack, particularly since Judge Crittenden makes a point of
rewarding the Department for these three alterations. “[D]uring the
course of this litigation the protocol has been amended by the Department of Corrections to increase the dosage of the short acting barbiturate, to drop one procedure (the cut-down), and the Department’s
medical personnel have agreed that any injection in the neck is inappropriate. The unilateral actions by the Department are commendable.”
(p. 12)
To the unknowing death penalty observer, such preemptory moves
on the part of the Kentucky Department of Corrections may seem
minor, even expected. However, in the context of over a quarter century
of litigation on lethal injection, these changes are amazingly substantial
and revealing. There is no evidence that the department would have
taken such extreme steps to implement these protective measures had
the Frankfort bench trial not taken place. The department’s behavior
also acknowledges its awareness of Judge Crittenden’s concern that important safeguards for lethal injection be instituted. Thus, it becomes
apparent that inmates’ challenges against execution methods can have
an impact irrespective of how a court finds the method’s overall constitutionality.
But Judge Crittenden’s expectations for lethal injection safeguards
do not stop with these three alterations. His opinion also spotlights his
belief that Kentucky’s protocol should be made public so that it can be
scrutinized. As Judge Crittenden emphasizes, “[t]he citizens of this Commonwealth are entitled to know the method and manner for implementing their public policy.” (p. 13) Likewise, Judge Crittenden notes
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that the reasons the Department of Corrections had previously used to
justify the “confidential nature” of the protocol no longer exist. (p. 12)
Therefore, “[t]he Department of Corrections should amend the current
protocol to eliminate the need to protect its contents from public view.”
(p. 12) In particular, “[s]ince the nature of the drugs used and the
method for administering those drugs during an execution have been
discussed publicly in this action, there seems to be little reason why the
Department of Corrections cannot publish a lethal injection protocol
that does not compromise the security of the institution or the personnel involved.” (p. 13) I feel particularly vindicated by this aspect of
Judge Crittenden’s decision. During the time of my lethal injection survey, my assistant and I had made a concerted attempt to acquire Kentucky’s protocol and were unable to do so. We felt there was something
very wrong about a procedure that could never be known, and therefore
never be judged.
I did think Judge Crittenden’s decision rang of naiveté in some
places. He seemed to put more medical trust than is warranted in the Department of Corrections personnel, despite his recognition of their lack
of qualifications. For example, Judge Crittenden noted that “the current
lethal injection protocol requires the Warden . . . [t]o reconstitute the
Sodium Thiopental into solution form prior to injection [and] [t]he Warden has no formal training on reconstituting the drug” (p. 7); yet, Judge
Crittenden did not consider this medical ignorance on the Warden’s part
to be problematic. Judge Crittenden stated that the drug manufacturer’s
instructions are sufficiently straightforward to follow and “there would be
minimal risk of improper mixing [of the drugs], despite converse testimony that a layperson would have difficulty performing this task.” (p. 7)
Likewise, Judge Crittenden acknowledges that sodium thiopental and
pancuronium bromide can precipitate and clog the tubes distributing the
chemicals to the inmate’s body and also that the Department of Corrections provides no device to monitor the level of an inmate’s consciousness. Again, however, he states that the risks of these occurrences are
minimal. I think he is wrong. Such seemingly minor indications of ignorance concerning the lethal injection procedure have been linked to
major lethal injection botches in this country. I have confidence that
another court will address these kinds of problems in the future.
Overall, however, Judge Crittenden provided an impressive opinion. I do think the holding would have been more consistent with the
other points and clarifications Judge Crittenden makes had he declared
lethal injection unconstitutional. Regardless, Judge Crittenden’s deci164
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sion is a far bolder declaration than the press seems to have realized and
its conclusions make great progress in the direction of reforming the
lethal injection procedure.

Departing Comments
Of course, I want lethal injection to be abolished as quickly as possible.
Since 1976, there have been 973 executions in the United States. A
total of 805 (83 percent) of those executions, the great majority, have
been carried out by lethal injection. In my mind, nearly every inmate
who is to be executed in this country risks facing a torturous death.
Pro-death penalty commentators often say that critics of lethal injection are just using this issue as a ploy to eliminate the death penalty entirely (recall, for example, the comments of e-mailer #2 labeling me a
hypocrite for this very reason). Yet, there is no basis for such an accusation. Regardless, that characterization does not apply to me. In theory I
do not oppose the death penalty. I can envision how the punishment of
death may make a socially worthy statement when applied to those whose
existence is clearly too despicable for us to even consider them human.
But I do question whether the criminal justice system can ever select out those who deserve death in a fair, bias-free way and then execute them according to the standards of the Eighth Amendment.
Indeed, there is no evidence that the death penalty can be inflicted in a
consistently constitutional manner. In sharp contrast, there is a great
deal of evidence showing the brutality and incompetence of the lethal
injection procedure, so much so that I cannot comprehend anyone condoning it, no matter what their views on capital punishment.
Both Justices Harry Blackmun and Lewis Powell ultimately concluded that the death penalty should be abolished because it could
never be administered equitably or meaningfully under any set of rules.
I feel the same way. And if people find this approach hypocritical then
I suppose those people and I do not share the same vocabulary. As I
mentioned previously, death penalty issues involve a battle of words,
both said and unsaid. Perhaps this is the time to say less—and do
more—in order to bring meaning to how we define justice.
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Appendix
E-mailer #1: I am appalled at your endeavors to obliterate lethal injection as a means of execution. How is it that those who kill people in the
most brutal ways possible are deserving of painless death in the most humane way possible? Perhaps if you were forced to suffer the maceration
of the most intimate part of your body and then forced to endure death
by strangulation, what I have stated might have significance.
The skilled American Judiciary creates more individual horror
than Adolph Hitler could possibly imagine. Consider for a moment,
the level of compassion and consideration a child molester has for a
young victim he has just raped and then killed by choking him or her
to death. How is it that those individuals are entitled to years of adjudication [over] victim expense? I am hoping that the Courts will reject
your case. However, with the predominance of maggot mentality on
both sides of the bench that exist in contemporary judicial circles, I
fear the worst!
E-mailer #2: You might consider the cruel and unusual punishment
meeted [sic] out to the two police officers and their families and the two
robbery victims and their families before you complain about their murderers suffering for a brief period from a leathal [sic] injection. Your
client’s pain will be momentary, the families’ pain is perpetual.
You obviously oppose capital punishment, but to base that opposition on the pain a murderer might suffer is specious, to say the least.
Make your case against capital punishment on honest grounds, not this
hypocracy [sic].
Incidentally, I would like to see these two spend the rest of their
lives behind the walls, since death is too easy and too quick. My only
concern is that after a few years people like you would claim they have
been rehabilitated, and should be returned to society. No one ever seems
to care about the victims or their families, do they?
E-mailer #3: I read with interest about you trying to have the death
penalty as we know it in this country overturned, especially lethal injection. I am an avid supporter of the death penalty. Lethal injection is
the most humane way to end a condemned persons [sic] life. The laws
in this country are a derivative of the Judo Christian ethics and law. I
also believe that executing a condemn [sic] person is not a deterrent for
future crime, but it does provide supreme closure for the victims [sic]
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family to the extent that this evil person will never ever again do another evil atrocity. I truly believe you are supporting a loss [sic] cause,
with the public news media broadcasting more heinous crimes to gain
television ratings every day the [sic] will be an ever increasing public cry
for more stiffer punishment including the death penalty. When my president George Bush keeps appointing more conservative justices to the
courts during the remaining [sic] of his administration the liberal groups
will find great difficulty if not impossible [sic] to change certain laws
concerning the death penalty and gay marriage.
If you believe that lethal injection is inhumane, lets [sic] try [the]
firing squad or a public hanging for the public broadcast networks to
air, especially in high definition. Now that in and of itself could be a
vast deterrent for future heinous crime. Prisons are full and taxpayers
that have been paying the tab for lifetime incarceration [and] angry.
As our population [sic] the baby boomers ages they become more conservative and a huge voting block to be reckon [sic] with. Remember
it’s the “Red States” that count! I respect your opinion just as you
respect mine.
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Notes
1. Baze et al. v. Rees et al., No. 04-CI-1094, Franklin Circuit Court, Kentucky (July 8,
2005), was a bench trial because it was a civil matter. The two condemned inmates, who
are plaintiffs, brought a suit challenging the constitutionality of lethal injection as a
method of execution in Kentucky. The defendants are the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, the Warden of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, and
the Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The remedy sought was a declaratory
judgment. Before the trial started, a preliminary injunction had already been granted by
Judge Crittenden, barring the use of lethal injection.
2. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004), was an unanimous opinion delivered by
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.
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